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RECENT media attention and aggressive marketing by environmental
professionals, publications, and conference sponsors have focused
X the attention of the real estate community on environmental con-
cerns. Though subject to hyperbole, this publicity stems from concerns that
are both real and often material to transactions involving the sale, lease, or
mortgaging of real property. This Article provides an overview of environ-
mental considerations relevant to real estate transactions and an analytical
framework for evaluating those considerations.
I. OVERVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Environmental laws regulate human activities because of the actual or po-
tential effect these activities have on the environment or on human health via
the environment. For purposes of this Article, programs established by envi-
ronmental statutes may be divided into three broad categories, based on
their principle objectives: (1) Pollution Control; (2) Chemical Regulation;
and (3) Environmental Review and Protection.
A. Types of Federal Environmental Programs
1. Pollution Control
Pollution programs generally seek to protect human health and welfare
and the environment by prescriptively regulating the discharge of contami-
nants into various media. Examples of such programs are the Clean Air Act
(CAA),I which regulates pollutant emissions to the air, the Clean Water Act
(CWA),2 which regulates pollutant discharges to water, and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),3 as amended by the Haz-
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7402-7462 (1988).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA),4 and the Under-
ground Injection Control (UIC) program of the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA),5 which regulate pollutant releases onto or under land. These pro-
grams establish permitting programs that require pre-construction or pre-
operation environmental review, including public notice and the opportunity
for an adjudicatory hearing.6 To obtain these permits, owners or operators
of proposed facilities generally must demonstrate compliance with both tech-
nology-based standards and standards relating to the quality of the ambient
environment. 7 Issued permits contain not only substantive requirements,
but administrative requirements as well, including testing, reporting, record-
keeping, and authorization of inspections. To encourage compliance, these
programs provide for substantial sanctions, both civil and criminal.8
A subcategory of pollution programs includes those that seek to alleviate
problems resulting from past disposal practices. Included within this subcat-
egory are the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund),9 as amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),10 and
section 7003 of RCRA.II Under both statutes, retroactive liability is im-
posed on specified parties. 12 CERCLA additionally establishes a compre-
hensive regulatory scheme to identify, investigate, and remediate problem
sites.' 3 To assist in the development of a data base, CERCLA also estab-
lishes prescriptive notification requirements for incidents and conditions of
environmental contamination.14
2. Chemical Regulation
Chemical regulatory programs seek to protect public health and the envi-
ronment by regulating the handling, use, manufacture, importation, and dis-
tribution of chemicals. These types of programs include: the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA),15 the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),16 and the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) 17 of SARA. A related program is the drink-
ing water program of the SDWA,' 8 which imposes regulatory requirements
4. Id. §§ 6901, 6902, 6905, 6912, 6915-6917, 6921-6931, 6933, 6935-6939, 6941, 6943-
6945, 6948, 6949a, 6956, 6962, 6972, 6973, 6976, 6979a, 6979b, 6982, 6984, 6991, 6991a-6991i.
5. Id. §§ 300h-1 to -5.
6. Id. §§ 7475(a)-(e), 6925(a)-(c), 300h-3Cb)(1)-(3); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1345 (1988).
7. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)-(e), 6925(a)-(c), 300h-3(b)(1)-(3); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1345
(1988).
8. Id. §§ 300h-2(b), 300h-3(c), 7413 (1988); 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1988).
9. Id. §§ 9601-9657 (1988).
10. Id." §§ 9601-9675.
11. Id. § 6973.
12. Id. §§ 6991e, 9607(a).
13. Id. § 9621.
14. Id. § 9603(a), (c).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988).
16. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-13 6y (1988).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988).
18. Id. §§ 300g-300j.
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on the supply of potable water to the public. 19 These programs, too, contain
substantial sanctions for noncompliance. 20
3. Environmental Review and Protection
Environmental review and protection programs seek to protect the envi-
ronment, or various segments of the environment, and human welfare gener-
ally through procedural and substantive environmental review requirements
superimposed on other governmental programs as a prerequisite to federal
activity. In these types of programs, the focus of environmental review may
be broad or relatively narrow, with concern for a particular aspect of the
environment. For example, the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)21 generally requires consideration of a broad range of environmen-
tal impacts associated with various alternatives prior to taking federal ac-
tion,22 while the National Flood Insurance Program23 seeks to restrict
development in flood-prone areas. For a number of environmental review
programs, the titles indicate their specific focus and objectives, for example,
the Endangered Species Act, 24 the National Historic Preservation Act,25 the
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act,26 the Coastal Zone Management Act,27
and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.28
B. Types of State Environmental Programs
1. In General
Many of the federal environmental programs have state analogs. In gen-
eral, state environmental programs fall into categories similar to their federal
counterparts. Some of these state programs seek to implement federal stat-
utes that expressly provide for state assumption of responsibility. Prime ex-
amples are the federal pollution programs implemented by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which provide for state assump-
tion, contingent on federal guidelines being satisfied. 29 In states that have
assumed responsibility for federal pollution programs, EPA involvement is
limited to an oversight role. In states having programs that have not quali-
fied, dual and parallel federal and state programs may exist. Texas, for ex-
ample, has parallel waste water discharge permit programs: administered by
the EPA, on the one hand, and by the Texas Water Commission, on the
other.30 Other state statutes may supplement federal programs and operate
19. Id
20. Id §§ 300g-3(b), 300h-2(b), 300i, 300j(e).
21. Id. §§ 4321-4370a.
22. Id. § 4332.
23. Id. §§ 4001-4104.
24. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
25. Id § 470.
26. Id. §§ 661-666(c).
27. Id. §§ 1451-1464.
28. Id. §§ 1271-1282.
29. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1342, 1345 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h-3001, 7402, 7410, 7470-7479,
7501-7508 (1988).




2. Independent, Supplemental State Programs
Though state pollution programs generally parallel their federal counter-
parts and supplant them upon state assumption, they also may supplement
them, regulating activities not regulated by the federal programs. In Texas,
the state has established its own program for the regulation of both indus-
trial and municipal solid wastes,31 in addition to having assumed responsibil-
ity for the federal hazardous waste program under RCRA. Many states
have adopted their own Superfund programs that operate independently of
the federal program, which, though providing for federal-state cooperation
and coordination, does not provide for state assumption.3 2 With respect to
chemical regulatory programs, California has developed its own program,
Proposition 65, 33 which is of significantly broader applicability than TSCA.
TSCA itself does not provide for state assumption. As regards environmen-
tal review, many states have their own NEPA-type review programs. 34 New
Jersey has developed an innovative environmental review program pursuant
to its Environmental Cleanup and Responsibility Act (ECRA),35 which
prohibits certain property transfers without governmental approval. 36
3. State Administrative Procedures
States implement their environmental programs in accordance with state
administrative procedures. In Texas, for example, the Administrative Pro-
cedure and Texas Register Act (APTRA),37 which applies to state pollution
31. Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 678, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2612 (Vernon) (to be
codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361 (Vernon)), as amended by Act of June 14,
1989, ch. 583, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1921 (Vernon); Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 335,§ 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1302 (Vernon); Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 536, § 3, 1989 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 1755 (Vernon); Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 703, §§ 1-8, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 3212 (Vernon); Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 639, § 5, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2120
(Vernon); Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 641, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2123 (Vernon); Act of
June 14, 1989, ch. 400, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1542 (Vernon); Act of June 16, 1989, ch.
1143, §§ 3-8, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4721 (Vernon); Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 705, § 1,
1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3237 (Vernon).
32. See, e.g., Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance Account Act, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25300-25386.6 (Deering 1988); Superfund Law, KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 65-3452a to 3459 (1989); Environmental Response and Liability Act, MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 115B.01-.24 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989); Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11 to .34 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 678,§ 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2646 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 361.181-.352 (Vernon)), as amended by Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 703, §§ 5-8, 1989
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3218 (Vernon).
33. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 25249.5-.73 (Deering 1988).
34. See, eg., Environmental Quality Assessment Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 25570-25570.4 (Deering 1988); Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972,
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.012-.10 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989); Critical Areas Act, MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 116G.01-. 14 (West 1987); Land Use and Development Law, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 6001-6002 (1984 & Supp. 1989).
35. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-6 to -13 (West Supp. 1989).
36. Id. § 13:IK-I 1.
37. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a (Vernon Supp. 1989).
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program permitting, establishes not only formal requirements for public no-
tice and opportunity for a public hearing, but also procedures for the con-
duct of such hearings equivalent to those employed in civil litigation before a
judge without a jury.38 These hearings often are protracted, entailing signifi-
cant discovery and detailed legal arguments. 39
II. EFFECTS ON REAL ESTATE OF VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRAMS
A. Environmental Concerns In General
Parties to any real estate transaction should understand that environmen-
tal programs affect real estate in two significant ways: (1) they impose re-
strictions that affect the ability to use a property for a particular purpose,
and (2) they create liabilities. For those engaged in real estate transactions
generally, environmental concerns relate to potential land use restrictions
and liabilities attributable to on-site conditions, which are predicated on a
party's ownership or other involvement with property. For those intending
new uses of property, an additional concern relates to the costs of attaining
and maintaining environmental compliance for those uses. For those en-
gaged in transactions involving not only real estate, but an ongoing business,
further concerns include liabilities for prior activities that contributed to an
off-site environmental or human health threat or that were in violation of an
applicable environmental law. Whether liabilities for prior activities are
transferred as a result of a transaction turns on whether that transaction
involves the transfer of assets or of company ownership, as in a merger,
either expressly or judicially inferred.40
To properly evaluate the relevance of environmental concerns to a trans-
action, it is necessary to understand the real property effects of the various
environmental programs. The ways environmental programs are imple-
mented determine how they affect real estate and real estate transactions.
Specific liabilities and land use restrictions created by these programs are
discussed below.
B. Specific Real Estate Effects of Environmental Programs
1. Programs Creating Liability
Prescriptive pollution programs and chemical regulatory programs are
relevant in transactions involving ongoing businesses because they give rise
to substantial liabilities for prior activities that were conducted in violation
of an applicable requirement.41 For transactions in which the development
of a new business is contemplated, as well as transactions involving existing
businesses, these two types of programs also are of concern because of the
significant costs associated with attaining and maintaining compliance.
38. Id art. 6252-13a, § 12.
39. Id. art. 6252-13a, §§ 13-14.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 145-155.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 219-238.
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Under pollution programs, technical requirements significantly affect the
feasibility and conditions of an existing or new use.42 Pre-activity environ-
mental review of new uses under pollution programs, including the potential
for protracted public hearings, affects the amount of time and money re-
quired to implement those uses.43
Other pollution programs, as well as section 6(e) of TSCA,44 are of con-
cern to parties involved in real estate transactions because they create liabili-
ties associated with on-site conditions. 45 Included in this category are:
CERCLA46and section 7003 of RCRA, 47 which impose liability on, among
others, owners and operators of property contaminated with hazardous sub-
stances; National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(NESHAPs) for asbestos pursuant to the CAA,48 which impose on owners
and operators of buildings containing asbestos significant regulatory require-
ments relating to the demolition or renovation of those buildings; 49 the un-
derground storage tank (UST) program of RCRA, which imposes significant
regulatory requirements on present and past owners and operators of under-
ground storage tanks; 50 and section 6(e) of TSCA, 51 which is the statutory
basis for EPA's program for the regulation of polychlorinated biphenyl
(PCBs), that regulates PCBs in transformers, capacitors, and other equip-
ment that might be found at an ongoing business or previously developed
site.52 For on-site conditions involving asbestos, PCBs, or hazardous sub-
stances that were stored in USTs, CERCLA provides an alternative basis for
liability.53
The presence of hazardous substances, asbestos, USTs and PCBs, as well
as radon and indoor air pollution, which, though subject to study, currently
are not subject to regulation, may give rise to liability under the common
law, specifically, under contractual and tortious theories of liability.54 Com-
mon law actions may involve not only parties to the transaction, but third
parties as well, such as toxic tort litigation brought by adjacent residents or
property owners or by employees. The presence of these on-site conditions,
of course, affects property value.
CERCLA is of concern not only because it creates liability for owners of
property for on-site conditions, 55 but also because it creates liability for
those acquiring ongoing businesses, or responsibility for former businesses,
42. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-2, 6925, 7411, 7412 (1988).
43. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 60, 61, 122, 141-143, 270, 401-699 (1988).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1988).
45. 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.140-.156 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 37,194 (1988) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. §§ 280-281).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
47. Id. § 6973.
48. 40 C.F.R. § 61(A), (M) (1988).
49. Id.
50. 53 Fed. Reg. 37,194 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 280-281).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1988).
52. 40 C.F.R. § 761 (1988).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 92-99.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
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that disposed of wastes at sites subject to, or potentially subject to, CERCLA
investigative and remedial actions. 56 Under CERCLA, potentially responsi-
ble parties (PRPs) under section 107 include not only site owners and opera-
tors, but also certain transporters and generators, as well as others who
arranged for disposal of wastes at the site.57 Each of these PRPs may be
subject to common law liability also.
2 Programs Creating Land Use Restrictions
Environmental review and protection programs are of concern in real es-
tate transactions because of the restrictions they create on land use. Exam-
ples of such programs include the National Flood Insurance Program,58
which restricts development in the flood plain, and the Endangered Species
Act,59 which restricts development in designated critical habitats of endan-
gered species. The review required by these programs also may result in
delay and in the exacting of regulatory concessions by agencies in exchange
for necessary federal approval or concurrence.
Some pollution programs regulate land use directly. The SDWA, 6 for
example, provides for the establishment of sole source aquifers, 61 such as the
Edwards Aquifer in Texas. 62 Pursuant to that program, the Texas Water
Commission has imposed certain land use restrictions in counties located
atop the aquifer recharge area.63 The recent amendments to the SDWA pro-
vide for the establishment of wellhead protection areas, which also will re-
strict land use." Section 404 of the CWA, 65 though a pollution permit
program, operates as a de facto wetlands preservation program by restricting
development in wetlands areas. Courts have construed the CWA to apply
not only to the placement of dredged materials into bodies of water, but also
to the use of tractors to clear bottomland hardwoods. 66 CERCLA and other
programs 67 relating to on-site conditions may create de facto and, in some
instances, de jure restrictions on land use. Both federal and state Superfund
programs also provide for the imposition of liens on government remediated
sites to secure payment of governmental costs. 68
On the local level, many cities have watershed protection ordinances that
significantly affect development in some areas.69 Other local programs re-
56. Id
57. Id
58. Id §§ 4001.4104.
59. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-1 1 (1988).
61. Id. § 300h-6; 40 C.F.R. § 149 (1988).
62. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.046 (Vernon 1988).
63. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 31, § 313 (Vernon 1987).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7 (1988).
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
66. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
67. 40 C.F.R. §§ 61, 264.117 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(e) (1988).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (1988); see Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 678, § 1 (to be codified at
TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.196).
69. See City of Austin v. Jamail, 662 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ dism'd);
Royal Crest v. City of San Antonio, 520 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ
1990]
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strict the withdrawal of groundwater and its availability for developmental
purposes, as in the Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence District.70 Water
rights, a related area not within the scope of this Article, also may affect land
use.
Several of the pollution programs restrict land use indirectly. Under the
federal CAA,71 certain types of construction of new sources of air contami-
nants may be restricted based on the air quality of the region in which the
property is located. 72 Restrictions on existing sources of air contaminants
also may affect the viability of a particular use. Similarly, under the CWA,
discharges into watercourses may be restricted because of water quality limi-
tations. This potential limitation affects the uses available for property with
wastewater discharge needs. 73
III. IDENTIFICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
A. Sources of Environmental Concerns
Environmental concerns include potential liabilities and land use restric-
tions. Environmental liabilities may arise under both common and statutory
law.74 Environmental land use restrictions are statutory-based.75
1. Statutory-based Environmental Concerns
There are five sources of statutory-based environmental liabilities. These
sources include: (1) statute; (2) regulation; (3) permit; (4) administrative
order; and (5) judicial order. The liabilities created by regulation, permit,
and administrative order ultimately are statutory-based.
In some instances, statutory provisions are self-implementing and create
immediate liability either for noncompliance, for example, hazardous sub-
stance site and release reporting requirements under CERCLA,76 or for hav-
ing had involvement in a site posing a threat to human health or the
environment so as to qualify as a PRP under section 107 of CERCLA, irre-
spective of compliance. 77 In other instances, regulations are necessary to
flesh out and implement statutory programs before liability can attach, as
with NESHAPs under the CAA. 78
Under the prescriptive pollution programs, a significant mechanism for
achieving regulatory objectives is through permitting, pursuant to regula-
ref'd n.r.e.); City of Austin Code tit. IX, ch. 13-15, art. 5, §§ 13-15-1 to -287 (1981); City of
Del Rio Code of Ordinances § 49-712 (1987).
70. Act of Apr. 23, 1975, ch. 284, §§ 1-49, 1975 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 672 (Vernon),
amended by Act of June 15, 1977, ch. 557, §§ 24, 37, 1977 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1390 (Vernon)
and Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 1107, §§ 19A-B, 36A, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3805 (Vernon).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7402-7462 (1988).
72. Id. § 7407.
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1988).
74. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991e, 9607 (1988).
75. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, 470, 661-666 (1988).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1988).
77. Id. § 9607.
78. 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.01-.252 (1988).
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tions establishing procedural and substantive requirements. Examples of
such permits include NPDES discharge permits7 9 and section 404 dredge
and fill permits 8° under the CWA, construction permits under the CAA, 81
UIC permits under the SDWA,82 and hazardous waste treatment, storage,
and disposal permits under RCRA.83 These permits contain enforceable
conditions, compliance with which may entail significant expenditures and
violation of which may give rise to significant liabilities.84
Violations of statutes, regulations, and permits may lead to administrative
or judicial orders that contain conditions, 5 the violation of which gives rise
to additional liability. PRP liability under section 107 of CERCLA is im-
posed through administrative or judicial orders.86 The violation of adminis-
trative orders may result in judicial orders. Land use restrictions generally
result from regulations or from permits and may be included in either ad-
ministrative or judicial orders.8 '
The costs of attaining and maintaining environmental compliance are sub-
stantial. To encourage compliance and to discourage noncompliance, envi-
ronmental statutes contain significant sanctions. Civil sanctions include civil
penalties and injunctive relief, compelling compliance or prohibiting contin-
ued noncompliance.88 Criminal sanctions, available only if culpable intent is
established, may be imposed on responsible individuals as well as on compa-
nies, and include fines and imprisonment. 89
Under section 107 of CERCLA, liability generally arises not in the form
of sanctions, but rather as costs of investigation and remediation of sites
posing a threat to human health or the environment, costs associated with
natural resource damage, and costs of required health assessments. 90 This
liability may arise as a result of litigation brought not only by the govern-
ment but by private parties as well, usually incident to litigation involving
the real property transaction. Failure to comply with CERCLA administra-
tive or judicial orders gives rise to further liability. For example, failure to
comply without good cause with a section 106 order requiring remediation
of a site gives rise to a penalty of three times the cost of remediation. 91
79. Id. §§ 122.1-.64.
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
81. 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.1-.685.(1988).
82. Id. §§ 144.1-.55.
83. Id. §§ 270.1-.73.
84. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-3, 300h-1, 6928, 7413 (1988).
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(2)(A), (B) (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-3(c), 6928(a), 7413(a)(2)(A)
(1988).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
87. See, eg., 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.1-.603 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 31,138 (1988) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. §§ 264.1-.603); 54 Fed. Reg. 26,594 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.1-
.603).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h-2(b), 6928(g), 7413(c) (1988).
89. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h-2(b), 6928(d) (1988).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
91. Id. § 9607(c)(3).
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2. Common Law Sources of Environmental Liability
a. Toxic Tort.
In addition to statute, environmental liabilities may arise under the com-
mon law. Persons associated with activities or conditions that have resulted
in actual or threatened damages to human health or property may incur
liability as a result of litigation under the common law. Sources of common
law environmental liability include negligence, trespass, nuisance, and strict
liability in tort.92
Toxic tort litigants may seek to join parties to a real estate transaction,
based on their nexus to property.93 Lawsuits have been brought not only
against parties to transactions involving contaminated property, but also
against parties to a transaction involving adjacent property.94
Toxic tort litigation often involves both statutory and common law claims.
This type of litigation generally is brought by landowners or residents of
adjacent properties, but also may be brought by their invitees, contractors,
or employees, or by invitees, contractors, or employees of the person owning
or operating the property on which the condition exists. Claims may include
personal injury, damage to property, and diminution in property value.95
Although CERCLA does not provide causes of action for toxic torts, SARA
did create an exception to state statutes of limitation for hazardous sub-
stance cases. SARA established as the commencement date for the running
of limitations the date plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that
the personal injury or property damage was caused or contributed to by the
hazardous substance concerned. 96
b. Contract Related Claims.
A related source of liability may arise as a result of the real property trans-
action. Causes of action may be brought by disgruntled parties to a transac-
tion against others involved in that transaction. For instance, the seller,
lender, broker, appraiser, or attorney may bring suit, based on: breach of
contract, tortious theories such as fraud or negligent misrepresentation, or
state deceptive trade practices acts.97 This type of litigation also may in-
volve claims based on nuisance and other common law environmental theo-
92. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 311-20 (D. Tenn. 1986),
modified, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
93. See Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572-74
(5th Cir. 1988).
94. Powell v. Pulte Home Corp., No. 84-75865 (D. Tex. 1984). In this case, homeowners
of properties adjacent to the Brio Superfund site sued the developer, asserting fraud. Follow-
ing a jury trial that found for the plaintiffs, developers settled and were subrogated to the
claims of the aggrieved homeowners against operators and generators. No opinion was issued.
For a report of the case, see Dallas Morning News, Oct. 19, 1989, at 14A.
95. See Sterling, 647 F. Supp. at 306.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(1) (1988).
97. See, e.g., Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th
Cir. 1988); South Shore Bank v. Stuart Title Guar. Co., 688 F. Supp. 803 (D. Mass. 1988);
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986); United States
v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
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ries, as well as claims based on CERCLA.98 Surprisingly, sellers also have
brought CERCLA-based claims.99
B. The Environmental Audit
1. Areas of Inquiry
To identify various environmental concerns, an industry has arisen to con-
duct so-called environmental audits or surveys. Today most savvy sellers,
purchasers, lessors, lessees, and lenders will not engage in a commercial or
industrial real estate transaction without having had an environmental audit
conducted by an environmental consultant.
a. On-site Conditions.
These audits typically focus on on-site conditions, though the scope may
extend to conditions on adjacent properties that might affect the subject
property. Environmental consultants generally describe environmental au-
dits as being conducted in phases: Phase 1, an on-site investigation, and re-
view of pertinent documents, and Phase II, actual testing of soils,
groundwater, surface water, or building components or air quality.
The Phase I investigation may involve review of: company and agency
documents, historical aerial photographs, title reports identifying prior own-
ers and environmental hens, and literature surveys, such as a computer-as-
sisted search of current periodicals. The on-site investigation includes a
walk-through and visual inspection looking for evidence of potential con-
cerns, such as stressed vegetation or insulation suggesting the presence of
asbestos; it also may include interviews with on-site personnel and adjacent
residents or businesses. The Phase II investigation generally is triggered by
Phase I findings, which are utilized to develop a tailored testing program. Ic0
b. Environmental Compliance.
For ongoing businesses subject to environmental regulation, the audit
should include an investigation of environmental compliance. A company
typically performs a compliance audit to determine if its existing operations
98. Emhart Indus., Inc. v. Duracell Int'l, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Tenn. 1987), is
typical. In that case, the purchaser brought a breach of contract suit against the seller. Dur-
ing the negotiations, the purchaser learned that PCBs had been used by the seller, resulting in
contamination. The purchaser, therefore, insisted on contractual provisions allocating liability
and guaranteeing the seller's promises. Although cleanup was effected, contaminants remain-
ing on the site continued to discharge into a nearby river. Suit was brought based on breach of
contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and the state unfair trade practices act. The
plaintiff also asserted a nuisance claim and a CERCLA claim. Although the court found a
misrepresentation had been made, the contractual limitations on that tort claim had expired.
Id. at 573. A statute similarly barred the nuisance action. The court, however, upheld the
CERCLA claim of the buyer to recover cleanup costs. Id. at 574.
99. See, eg., Garb-Ko, Inc. v. Lansing-Lewis Servs., Inc., 167 Mich. App. 779, 423
N.W.2d 355 (1988) (seller sought to rescind sales contract for gas station and auto parts store
after discovery of site contamination from underground storage tank leakage).
100. See, e.g., Consulting Engineers Council of Metropolitan Washington, Guidelines for
Environmental Site (1989).
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are in compliance with applicable requirements by comparing those opera-
tions against a check list developed for that type of facility. This type of
investigation is readily adaptable to, and often is conducted in conjunction
with, an acquisition.
As noted, prior violations and liability for off-site disposal at problem sites
should be of concern only when the purchaser will be standing in the shoes
of the seller, through an actual or de facto merger or some other theory of
successor liability. Ongoing violations are of concern regardless, however,
because the purchaser will be liable if the violations have not been cured as
of the date title is transferred or the purchaser begins operation. In that
case, the purchaser, ab initio, will be operating in violation and, of course,
will be responsible for its violations under statute as well as for compliance
with applicable requirements, even though the condition may have been cre-
ated by its predecessor.
For ongoing businesses and for intended new uses, the investigation
should extend not only to existing regulatory requirements, but also to regu-
latory requirements scheduled to be implemented in the future. Individual
facilities may have schedules of compliance, requiring that specific deadlines
be achieved. In addition, pertinent requirements under regulations may be-
come effective in phases. The audit should determine, therefore, not only
whether the business is in compliance, but whether, and at what cost, it can
continue to remain in compliance. Legislative and regulatory trends, there-
fore, also should be considered.
c. Land Use Restrictions.
Typically, environmental audits do not focus on land use restrictions. The
type of investigation that considers these concerns sometimes is referred to
as an environmental assessment. Air-quality-based or water-quality-based
restrictions and the presence of wetlands, flood plain, endangered species, or
historical or archeological sites identified in an environmental assessment
may affect the ability to develop property for its intended use. For new uses,
as well as for existing uses, these concerns should be addressed.
2. Content
For an environmental audit to be of value, it must produce usable results.
The report, therefore, should be written in an understandable and useful
manner. The report should not only identify environmental concerns, it
should quantify the probability of their occurrence, which may include a
range of possibilities, and it should discuss the range of costs associated with
addressing each potential concern. The degree of certainty of these estimates
also should be provided. Further, the report should identify the need for
additional investigation and the types of investigation that might be useful or
necessary to better quantify liabilities. The resulting report also can serve as




To ensure that an environmental audit does not overlook significant con-
cerns and, at the same time, remains cost-effective, it must be scoped prop-
erly. To properly scope an environmental audit, the person designing the
audit must focus on the nature of the transaction and the party for whom the
investigation is being performed. Though each party to a real estate transac-
tion has a common interest in knowing the pertinent facts, the legal ramifica-
tions of those facts differ for each party, especially in those transactions with
potential CERCLA concerns. CERCLA's significance stems, in part, from
the fact that the liabilities it creates may far exceed the value of the property.
These liabilities may arise not only from on-site conditions' 01 but, in transac-
tions involving ongoing or former businesses, from off-site conditions as
well.' 02 An understanding of the way in which CERCLA creates liability,
therefore, is essential to both real estate professionals and those involved in
business acquisitions.
IV. SUPERFUND
CERCLA, as amended by SARA, is more commonly referred to as
Superfund, after the hazardous waste trust fund that the law established to
fund cleanup of sites posing a threat to human health or the environment. 0 3
In its implementation, CERCLA affects real estate and real estate transac-
tions in a number of different ways. To assist real estate professionals, espe-
ially relevant concepts of CERCLA are discussed below.
A. Potentially Responsible Parties
Liabilities under CERCLA include costs of investigation, removal and
remediation, natural resource damages and damage assessments, and re-
quired human health assessments associated with a facility from which there
is a release, or a threatened release of a hazardous substance, which causes
response costs to be incurred.'0 4 Potentially responsible parties, PRPs, lia-
ble for those costs under CERCLA include: (1) the present owner or opera-
tor of a facility; (2) the owner or operator of a facility at the time of disposal
of hazardous substances; (3) any person who arranged for disposal or treat-
ment, or who arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat-
ment, of hazardous substances at a facility; and (4) any person who accepted
hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities selected
by that person. 10 5 The term "facility" includes buildings and any site where
a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, placed, or
otherwise came to be located. 10 6 The term "hazardous substance" is any
101. CERCLA is also a model for other related programs dealing with on-site conditions
and may supplement claims based on those programs, for example, asbestos, PCBs, and USTs.
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6793(c), 9607(a) (1988).
103. 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D) (1988).
105. Id. § 9607(a)(l)-(4).
106. Id. § 9601(9).
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substance designated under other specified environmental statutes, but ex-
pressly excludes petroleum, natural gas, and related substances.10 7
The potential applicability of each of these four classes of PRPs is of con-
cern in transactions involving ongoing businesses. Off-site disposal at prob-
lem sites, in particular, should be a significant concern in the acquisition of
any business, because of potential liability as an arranger; the majority of the
PRPs at most Superfund sites are generators. In real estate transactions, the
first two categories, applicable to present and prior owners and operators,
are of paramount concern.
Although the statutory language is somewhat ambiguous, referring, in one
place, to present "owners and operators" and, in another, to persons who
"owned or operated," the case law clearly establishes that Congress did not
intend to require that a PRP be both an owner and an operator: either will
suffice.'10  Courts, however, often fail to differentiate between the two terms,
especially in cases involving shareholder-officers and lenders, and have cre-
ated confusion in the case law.109 Because of this confusion and liberal ap-
plication of CERCLA to reach persons involved in real estate transactions, it
is useful to focus separately on each of these two terms.
1. Owner
a. Present and Prior Owners.
Consistent with the statutory language, the courts have explained that
present owners may be PRPs irrespective of whether the contamination was
placed on-site prior to their acquisition.1 0 For a present owner to be liable,
it is unnecessary that disposal occurred during its ownership; ownership per
se suffices.'1 Similarly, owners at the time of disposal also may be PRPs,
irrespective of whether they have abandoned the facility. 12
b. Interim Owners.
By its express terms, section 107 should not apply to interim owners of
Superfund facilities."13 In Cadillac Fairview California, Inc. v. Dow Chemi-
107. Id. § 9601(14). Some state Superfund programs do apply to petroleum products, e.g.,
Texas.
108. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 577-78 (D. Md.
1986). The definitional section of CERCLA defines the term "owner or operator," but pro-
vides little illumination, using the terms it is defining in the definition. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20)(A) (1988).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 110-213.
110. See Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th
Cir. 1988).
111. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985).
112. Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 671 (D. Idaho 1986).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988):
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section (1) the owner and operator of a
vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,... shall be liable ....
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cal Co. 1"4 the court found an interim owner not to be a PRP under section
107.115 On the other hand, in United States v. Carolawn Co. 116 the court
refused to grant summary judgment and to dismiss from the lawsuit a com-
pany that had held legal title to a site for only one hour.117 The decision,
however, appeared to have been based on the fact that the defendant had
transferred ownership to three of its employees rather than the fact of
ownership. 118
Some courts have suggested substantive bases for interim owner liability.
In Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc. 119 the owner's
grading of soil containing hazardous substances was found to constitute
treatment, creating potential liability for even an interim owner.' 20 Some
cases have suggested another factual basis for liability, based on the assump-
tion that leaking of on-site contaminants constitutes disposal.' 21 Other
courts have rejected this position.' 22 The expansion of CERCLA to reach
passive interim owners based on leaking appears unwarranted. SARA does
create an exception if the interim owner obtained and failed to disclose to the
purchaser actual knowledge of a release or threatened release. 123 In that
case, the interim owner may be held liable as a present owner.' 24
A similar issue involving interim owner liability arises under analogous
provisions of section 7003 of RCRA. 25 This section authorizes the EPA to
sue
any person (including any past or present generator, past or present
transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, stor-
age, or disposal facility) who has contributed or who is contributing to
[the] handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal [of any
solid waste or hazardous waste that may present an imminent substan-
tial endangerment to health or the environment].' 26
Although this provision applies to any past owner and, therefore, is broader
than CERCLA in that regard, it is narrower than CERCLA in that it re-
quires that owners, as well as others referenced in the provision, have con-
tributed to the waste management that poses the threat. Whether passive
ownership per se is adequate appears unlikely.
114. 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
115. Id. at 1113.
116. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,698 (D.S.C. 1984).
117. Id at 20,698-99.
118. Id. at 20,698.
119. 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988).
120. Id. at 1573.
121. See United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 199-200 (D.C. Mo.
1985); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1437 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
122. See Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, No. C-88-4813-JPV (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1989); 4 Toxic L.
Rep. 483 (Sept. 27, 1989).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(c) (1988).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 6973(a).
126. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 198 (W.D. Mo. 1985)




CERCLA clarifies that the term "owner" does not include a person who,
without participating in the management of the facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect a security interest in the facility.127 In
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. ' 28 the court found that a bank
that had foreclosed and purchased property did so to protect its investment
rather than its security interest and, therefore, was liable under CERCLA as
an owner. 129 In United States v. Mirabile 130 the court suggested foreclosure,
without operational involvement, would be inadequate to create liability.131
Significantly, the bank in Mirabile had assigned its bid to the Mirabiles who
accepted a sheriff's deed to the property. Though the bank physically se-
cured the property and showed it to prospective purchasers, it never ac-
quired legal title. Actual ownership, on the other hand, probably will give
rise to section 107 liability, irrespective of whether the intent is to protect the
value of the collateral.132
On April 25, 1989, Representative LaFalce introduced legislation, H.R.
2085,133 designed to protect financial institutions from environmental liabil-
ity when the institutions take title to foreclosed property or when they ac-
quire contaminated property as trustee of an estate. The bill expressly would
exclude from the CERCLA definition of owner or operator a financial insti-
tution that foreclosed on contaminated property or became a trustee.134 At
least one case has held a trustee liable as a site owner. 135
d. Lessors/Lessees.
In a number of cases, courts have held lessors whose lessees created con-
tamination liable as owners.136 Liability is predicated on current ownership
as well as ownership at the time of disposal.' 37 As between the parties, a
lessor may recover from its lessee who created the on-site contamination, 38
provided its lessee is solvent.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
128. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
129. Id. at 579.
130. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,995 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
131. Id. at 20,996.
132. See also Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572(5th Cir. 1988) (statute specifically imposes strict liability upon owners).
133. H.R. 2085, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
134. See [Current Developments] 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) (May 5, 1989).
135. United States v. Burns, Hazardous Waste Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publication) 13,705,
13,705 (D.N.H. Sept. 12, 1988).
136. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985) (owner responsi-
ble for unauthorized tenants); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1563(E.D. Pa. 1988) (owner and tenant jointly and severally liable); United States v. Argent, 21
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354, 1355 (D.N.M. 1984) (owner responsible regardless of connection
to tenant's business).
137. United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc. (SCRDI), 653 F. Supp.
984, 987 (D.S.C. 1984), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156, 103 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1989).
138. Caldwell v. Gurley Ref. Co., 755 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1985).
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In its June 6, 1989, Guidance on Landowner Liability under CERCLA, 139
the EPA in a footnote stated that: "The government has taken the position
that 'owner' for the purposes of liability includes 'lessee.' "40 The cases
cited for that proposition, 41 however, do not extend as far as the govern-
ment suggests. Basically, those cases involve situations in which the lessee
either acted in a quasi-ownership capacity, for example, by subleasing the
property, 42 or was involved as an operator because of its on-site activi-
ties.143 If the government's position were correct, then the renter of an
apartment conceivably could be held liable for pre-existing contamination of
the property upon which the apartment building rests. That type of interest
should not constitute ownership for purposes of CERCLA liability, espe-
cially since leases may establish only temporary relationships. Lessees
should not be liable for on-site conditions that they do not create, presuming
they do not exacerbate an existing problem. A long-term lease, such as
ninety-nine years, however, could be construed to approach an ownership
interest. One commentator has suggested that the analysis of whether a
lease creates an ownership interest should be based on generally acceptable
principles of accounting. 144
e. Successor Corporations.
The EPA, in an internal agency memorandum (the Price Memorandum),
asserted that successor corporations should be liable for actions of their
predecessors.145 The EPA argues for an expansion of successor liability be-
yond traditional corporate law doctrines. It suggests the appropriate test
should be whether the new corporation continues substantially the same
business operations as its predecessors.1 46 This position draws heavily on
analogy to products liability cases.
In New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. Gloucester Envi-
ronmental Management Services, Inc., 47 the court followed an approach
similar to that urged by the EPA. In that case, the court denied a motion for
summary judgment because factual issues existed concerning the relation-
ship between the. purchaser of a manufacturing plant and its predecessor,
139. 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235 (Aug. 18, 1989).
140. Id at 34,238 n.10.
141. SCRDI, 653 F. Supp. at 984; United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp.
742, 747-48 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
142. SCRDI, 653 F. Supp. at 1003.
143. Northernaire, 670 F. Supp. at 748.
144. See Feder, The Undefined Parameters of Lessee Liability Under CERCL4: The Trap
for the Unwary Lender, 19 ENvTL. L. 257, 267-69 (1988).
145. See Price, June 13, 1984, Memorandum, "Liability of Corporate Shareholders and
Successor Corporations for Abandoned Sites Under CERCLA" [hereinafter Price
Memorandum].
146. EPA notes four situations in which courts traditionally have imposed successor liabil-
ity in asset transfers: (1) the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to assume
such obligations; (2) the transaction amounts to a de facto consolidation or merger; (3) the
purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or (4) the transac-
tion was fraudulently entered into in order to escape liability. Id at 11.
147. 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1397 (D.N.J. 1988).
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suggesting the possibility of successor liability for off-site contamination as a
generator.148 Other cases, however, have. not followed the lead of the New
Jersey court and have relied instead on the de facto merger doctrine.
In several cases, purchasers of assets have been found to have incurred
CERCLA liability of their predecessors based on federal common law. In
Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.149 the court generally
found that the congressional intent in enacting CERCLA was to impose suc-
cessor liability on a corporation that merged or consolidated with a PRP and
suggested that a merger had occurred. 150 In In re Alleged PCB Pollution of
Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor 15' the court held a purchaser of as-
sets liable for cleanup costs, based on a liberal application of the de facto
merger doctrine, despite a disclaimer of liability in the acquisition document
for the contamination giving rise to liability.' 52 In Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v.
Asarco, Inc.,153 however, the court refused to find the purchaser of assets of a
copper mill liable for CERCLA cleanup.' 54 The court based its decision on
the lack of showing that any exception to traditional corporate successor law
existed. '55
Case law with regard to successor liability under environmental statutes is
evolving. In general, however, these cases suggest that any finding of succes-
sor liability in CERCLA actions likely will be based on traditional corporate
law and not on novel theories of environmental liability. The existence of
CERCLA claims, however, may be a significant consideration to the court in
deciding whether successor liability should be imposed.
2. Operator
Courts have broadly construed the term "operator" to apply to a variety
of persons who directly or indirectly are involved in waste management ac-
tivities of the facility. 1"6 The EPA has aggressively argued for this construc-
tion of the term. In the Price Memorandum, the EPA argues not only for a
liberal policy of successor liability, but also for a liberal policy of shareholder
liability independent of, though related to, the doctrine of piercing the cor-
porate veil."7
a. Officers, Employees, and Shareholders.
Consistent with the position espoused by EPA in the Price Memorandum,
a number of courts have extended operator liability to individuals who were
148. Id. at 1400.
149. 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 837, 102 L. Ed. 2d 969 (1988).
150. 851 F.2d at 91.
151. 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1723 (D. Mass. 1989).
152. Id. at 1726-30.
153. 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1450 (W.D. Wash. 1989).
154. Id. at 1453.
155. Id.
156. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699, 20,700 (D.S.C. 1984).
157. See Price Memorandum, supra note 145.
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shareholder officers or managers. 158 Though noting the shareholder rela-
tionship, the pertinent consideration appears not to have been ownership,
but rather the role of those individuals in the management of the com-
pany. 159 The pertinent inquiry resembles an aspect of the doctrine of pierc-
ing the corporate veil, 160 but focuses on the role of the shareholder in
decision-making affecting hazardous waste management activities.
In New York v. Shore Realty Corp. 161 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held a corporation's officer and stockholder liable for cleanup of a hazardous
waste disposal site.' 62 In placing direct liability upon the officer who made,
directed, and controlled all corporate decisions and actions, the court
pointed out that CERCLA defines "owner or operator" to mean "any per-
son owning or operating" a facility, including individuals as well as corpora-
tions. 163 Noting that the statute excludes from the definition "a person,
who, without participating in the management of a ... facility, holds indicia
of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the facility," the
court inferred that personal liability did exist for shareholders who did par-
ticipate in the management of a facility. 64
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals asserted that its reasoning followed
that of other courts that have addressed the issue, citing as examples United
States v. Carolawn Co. 165 and United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
& Chemical Co. (NEPA CCO).1 66 In Carolawn a district court applied the
same reasoning in denying motions to dismiss a CERCLA action by individ-
ual defendants who were corporate officials. 167 The corporate officials were
responsible for making the day-to-day operation decisions for the hazardous
waste disposal business, and in addition, owned stock in the corporation and
business site in an individual capacity for a short time.
In NEPACCC a federal district court applied this same reasoning as one
of two alternate bases for imposing CERCLA liability on a vice president
and major stockholder of a corporation. 168 The officer in question con-
trolled the corporate business in several aspects. For instance, he supervised
the chemical facility, arranged for the disposal and transport of the hazard-
158. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (officer control-
ling corporate conduct liable for torts under New York law); United States v. Northeastern
Pharm. & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp. 823, 848 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part and remanded, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987)
(defendant active in management).
159. Id.
160. In environmental cases, courts may pay less respect to the corporate form than they
would under the alter ego doctrine, disregarding corporate form "in the interest of public
convenience, fairness, and equity." See Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir.
1981).
161. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
162. Id. at 1052.
163. Id (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(A), (21) (1988)).
164. Id (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988)).
165. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699 (D.S.C. 1984).
166. 579 F. Supp. 823, 847-48 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded,
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
167. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,700.
168. 579 F. Supp. at 847.
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ous waste at the disposal site, and had direct knowledge and supervision of
the contract for transportation and the ultimate disposal site. The officer
also assisted in the selection of the disposal site by instructing the contractor
on favorable disposal-site characteristics.
The court also placed liability upon the founder and president of the cor-
poration, who was a major stockholder and who had supervised construction
of the plant, even though it was not established that the president possessed
prior direct knowledge of the plan to dispose of hazardous waste.169 Impor-
tantly, the court noted that this individual stockholder, as president, had the
capacity and general responsibility to control the disposal of hazardous
wastes at the company plant.' 70 Likewise, the president had the capacity to
prevent and abate the damage caused by the disposal of hazardous wastes. 171
These officer-shareholder cases have found individual liability for active
control or management over hazardous waste decision-making. In State v.
Bunker Hill Co. 172 a federal district court extended this reasoning to reach a
parent corporation that controlled its subsidiary more indirectly through the
corporate structure. 173 In that case Gulf Resources & Chemical Corpora-
tion (Gulf), relying on the Bunker Hill corporate entity, argued that the
court did not have jurisdiction because Grlf was a nonresident corporation.
Gulf also argued that it was not liable under CERCLA as an owner or oper-
ator. Gulf and Bunker Hill merged in May 1968, and Bunker Hill became
the wholly owned subsidiary of Gulf. Gulf contended that the Bunker Hill
facility was owned and operated by Bunker Hill, and not Gulf. The court
found that Gulf's many contacts with the Bunker Hill facility as a parent
corporation supported not only personal jurisdiction over Gulf, but also a
conclusion that Gulf was an owner or operator for purposes of CERCLA
liability. 174 Quoting NEPACCO 1 75 at length, the court held that the follow-
ing test may be employed to determine when a parent corporation becomes
an owner or operator with respect to a subsidiary's facilities: "The owner-
operator of a vessel or a vacility [sic] has the capacity to make timely discov-
ery of oil discharges. The owner-operator has power to direct the activities
of persons who control the mechanisms causing the pollution. The owner-
operator has the capacity to prevent and abate damages."' 76
Applying this test, the court found that Gulf was the owner-operator of
the Bunker Hill facility. ' 77 The court determined that Gulf was not only in
a position to be, and was, intimately familiar with hazardous waste disposal
169. Id. at 849.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
173. See also Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 832 (D. Vt. 1988) (parent corpora-
tion, executive officers, and majority shareholders of company liable for Superfund costs).
174. 635 F. Supp. at 671.
175. 579 F. Supp. at 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 810
F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
176. 635 F. Supp. at 672 (quoting NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 848-49, which in turn quotes




and releases at the Bunker Hill facility, but also that Gulf had the capacity
to control such disposal and releases.178 In addition, the court found that
Gulf had the capacity, if not the absolute authority, to make decisions and
implement actions and mechanisms that would have prevented the damage
caused by the disposal and releases of hazardous wastes at the facility.
1 79
While seeming to focus on the financial control of Bunker Hill by Gulf,
the court was careful to note that courts must take care in applying the test
so that a parent's normal activities with respect to its subsidiary do not auto-
matically lead a court to determine that the parent corporation is an owner
or operator.180 The court found Gulf liable as an owner or operator under
CERCLA because to hold otherwise would allow parent corporations to use
the corporate veil in frustration of congressional purpose. 81 This decision
blurs the distinction between an owner and an operator. Presumably the
court premised Gulf's liability on Gulf's control of operations, rather than
on its stock ownership. Other than the fact that stock ownership enabled
Gulf to control decisions and become an operator, stock ownership should
be irrelevant. The decision also is troubling because it focuses on the capac-
ity of the parent to control the subsidiary as well as on the actual involve-
ment of the parent in hazardous waste management activities of the
subsidiary. In Rockwell International Corp. v. IU International Corp. 182 the
court rejected such a test, explaining: "Mere ability to exercise control as a
result of the financial relationship of the parties is insufficient for liability to
attach. The entity must actually exercise control."
18 3
In United States v. Nicolet, Inc. 18 4 the court, ruling federal common law
applied, presumed to fashion a federal rule as to when the corporate veil can
be pierced in a CERCLA case based on control of the management and
operations of the subsidiary. 185 The court mistakenly relied on State v.
Bunker Hill Co. 186 as support for its determination. The Bunker Hill court,
however, based liability on the concept of operator liability under CERCLA,
not on the piercing doctrine.187 The Nicolet court confused these two re-
lated, but discrete, bases of liability. In United States v. Kayser-Roth
Corp. 188 the court held the parent company of a defunct subsidiary liable
under both theories of liability.
In Joslyn Corp. v. TL. James & Co. 189 a district court declined to follow





182. 702 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
183. Id. at 1390 (citations omitted).
184. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
185. Id. at 1202-04.
186. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
187. Id at 671-72.
188. 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989). The piercing test applied by the court was the liberal,
regulatory version, which provides that "a corporate entity may be disregarded in the interest
of public convenience, fairness, and equity." Id. at 23.
189. 696 F. Supp. 222, 224-25 (W.D. La. 1988).
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company liable, without piercing the corporate veil, for cleanup of a creosote
plant operated by its wholly owned subsidiary. 190 The court based its deci-
sion on the belief that it was improper to ignore the corporate form without
an express congressional directive. 19' That decision is on appeal.
b. Lenders.
As an alternative to owner liability, courts have suggested potential liabil-
ity of a lender as an operator. In United States v. Mirabile 192 the court,
though expressing its reservations, declined to dismiss a suit against a lender
because of a factual issue as to whether the lender's involvement in the man-
agement of its borrower caused it to be an operator. 193 In United States v.
Nicolet, Inc. 194 the government went so far as to assert that the mortgagee of
the operator of a site is liable, but in that case, the mortgagee participated in
the management and operational aspects of the facility. 195
In United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.196 a lender foreclosed on equip-
ment, but not real property. Leaking drums were removed and while mov-
ing equipment, asbestos, a hazardous substance, was dislodged, creating fact
issues as to whether Fleet, which authorized these activities, was an opera-
tor. The court focused on the so-called security interest exclusion, indicating
that the holding of indicia of ownership to protect a security interest with
participation in the management of the facility could give rise to liability. 1
97
The court seemed to suggest, correctly, that such liability is that of an opera-
tor rather than of an owner. 198 The case is on appeal.
c. Lessor/Lessee.
In United States v. Northernaire Plating Co. 199 the court held the lessee
was an operator.200 In that case, the defendant apparently operated a facil-
ity that may have contributed to or caused on-site contamination. In South
Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc. v. Searle (SCRDI) 201 the court also held
that the lessee was an operator.20 2 As a practical matter, operator rather
than owner liability should form the basis for lessee liability under CERCLA
unless the lessee subleases the property or has an interest of such duration as
to approach ownership.
190. Id. at 232.
191. Id. at 226.
192. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
193. Id. at 20,994
194. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa, 1989).
195. Id. at 1195.
196. 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1011 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
197. Id. at 1015-16.
198. Id.
199. 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
200. Id. at 747.
201. 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984).




Because CERCLA imposes liability that is both strict and joint and sev-
eral, both the government and private party plaintiffs have sought to expand
its applicability. Plaintiffs, in these cases, have focused on the terms "opera-
tor" and "arranger."
In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.20 3 a generator involved in
a CERCLA site at which it disposed of PCB materials filed a third-party
complaint against a supplier of PCBs, seeking contribution. The court found
the PCB supplier not liable because the supplier did not generate or dispose
of any hazardous waste and did not contract for any disposal.2° 4 In Edward
Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co.205 a former owner of a hazardous
waste site sought recovery for contribution against a company that had pre-
viously built the wood treating facility that caused the contamination and
that had supplied the chemicals. The court similarly declined to hold the
supplier liable as an operator, analogizing to the concept of independent con-
tract.206 In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. United States Gypsum 20 7
the court refused to hold a manufacturer of asbestos liable to a building
owner under CERCLA because the manufacturer had not disposed of
asbestos.203
On the other hand, the court in United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemi-
cals Corp.209 held a pesticide manufacturer liable as an arranger for the
cleanup of wastes produced by its formulator.2 10 In Ametek Inc. v. Pioneer
Salt & Chemical Co. 2 11 the court suggested that a chemicals supplier that
unloaded and possibly spilled chemicals at a site might be a PRP as an oper-
ator.212 The Ametek court noted that courts have focused on the degree of
control exercised over a facility in construing the term "operator. '213 These
cases typify a trend towards expanding liability under CERCLA to persons
not customarily considered to be PRPs.
B. Liens
Under CERCLA, cleanup costs incurred by environmental agencies give
rise to liens on the affected real property.2 14 Under section 107(1) of CER-
CLA, the lien arises at the time costs are incurred, but must be perfected,
and is subject to prior perfected security interests under applicable state
203. 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1230 (S.D. Ind. 1983).
204. Id. at 1233.
205. 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
206. Id. at 657-58.
207. 711 F. Supp. 1244 (D.N.J. 1989).
208. Id. at 1255.
209. 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
210. Id. at 1384.
211. 709 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded on other
grounds, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
212. Id. at 559-60.
213. Id. at 559.
214. 42 U.S.C. § 9607Q) (1988).
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law.215 The lien may be entered without opportunity for a hearing.216 In a
number of states, environmental liens are Superliens, taking priority over all
pre-existing liens, with the possible exception of tax liens. 217 The Superlien
statutes in some cases also authorize the imposition of liens on other prop-
erty, real or personal, but these liens do not take priority over prior recorded
liens.218
C. Causes of Action Under Superfund
Superfund litigation against PRPs may be brought by the government or
by private parties.219 Often, private party Superfund litigation is incident to
litigation involving the real estate transaction. A key distinction between
governmental and private party litigants relates to the ability of a PRP to
contract away liability. Section 107(e) allows parties to allocate CERCLA
liabilities among themselves, but renders ineffective any agreement to trans-
fer such liabilities with respect to the government. 220
Unlike private litigants, the government can issue an order requiring a
PRP to take action at any site posing a threat.221 The EPA may bring action
in federal court to enforce its orders and seek penalties of up to $25,000 per
day for willful violations or failure or refusal to comply with any govern-
ment order.222 In the alternative, the EPA may clean up the site itself and
seek costs under section 107(a) and punitive damages under section
107(c)(3) of three times the cost if failure to comply was without sufficient
cause.223 The EPA also may ask a federal court to issue an injunction under
section 106.224 CERCLA, as amended by SARA, provides for the establish-
ment of a hazardous waste trust fund or a "Superfund" to pay for cleanup of
sites posing a threat to human health or the environment. 225 The govern-
ment, and, under limited circumstances, private parties may take advantage
of the fund.226
The government, through the EPA, is authorized to tap the fund for up to
$2 million to deal with an immediate concern at any site from which there is
a release or substantial threat of release of a hazardous substance into the
215. Id.
216. Id. § 9607(1)(3).
217. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-7-417, 8-7-516 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22a-452a (West Supp. 1988); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E, § 13 (West Supp. 1988); ME.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371 (Supp. 1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b
(1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1 If(f) (West Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-209
(1987).
218. See, e.g., ME. REV. Cxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371 (Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 21E, § 13 (West Supp. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b (1987); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f(f) (West Supp. 1988).
219. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9696 (1988).
220. Id. § 9607(e).
221. Id. § 9606(a).
222. Id. § 9606(b).
223. Id. §§ 9607(a), 9607(c)(3).
224. Id. § 9606(a).
225. Id. §9611(a).
226. Id. § 9611 (a), (b).
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environment, or of any pollutant that poses a risk to public health or welfare
or the environment. 227 The government also may tap the fund for a full-
scale investigative and remediation program, but the site first must be listed
on the National Priority List (NPL), an appendix to the National Contin-
gency Plan, the regulations that guide EPA in its implementation of CER-
CLA.228 Under section 107, EPA is authorized to recover its response costs
from PRPs. 229
Though private parties also may request reimbursement from the fund, as
a practical matter, private parties who incur response costs are more likely
to recover their costs from PRPs. Private parties may seek recovery against
a PRP either in a suit for contribution, brought by a PRP under sections
107(a)(3) and 113(f), or in a private cause of action under section
107(a)(4)(B), brought by any person who has incurred response costs.230
A distinction exists between private and governmental reimbursement ac-
tion in that the government has the burden of establishing only that it in-
curred costs not inconsistent with the NCP while a private party
affirmatively must establish that its costs were consistent with the NCP.231
In Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica (ALCOA) 232 and in
Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp.233 the courts denied recovery against
prior owners because NCP procedural requirements were not satisfied.
Other courts, however, have been more lenient, suggesting that substantial
compliance will suffice. 234
With regard to both lawsuits for reimbursement and those involving gov-
ernmental orders, plaintiffs must establish that the defendant is a PRP.235
No need exists to establish that the PRP contributed in any way to the re-
lease in order to establish a prima facie case.236 The standard of liability is
strict, meaning that culpable intent and compliance with the law are irrele-
vant. Liability also is joint and several, meaning that any PRP may be sued
for the entire cost.237 SARA expressly ratified case law authorizing PRPs to
seek contribution from other PRPs.238
227. Ido § 9604(a), (c).
228. Id. § 9605; 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1988); see also the proposed revised National Contin-
gency Plan at 53 Fed. Reg. 51,394 (1988).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
230. Id. §§ 9607(a)(3), (a)(4)(B), 9613(f).
231. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
232. 711 F. Supp. 784, 796 (D.N.J. 1989).
233. 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1581-83 (E.D. Pa. 1988). In this case, the court noted the pur-
chaser was not precluded from seeking recovery under tort. Id. at 1582.
234. See NL Indus. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1986); Wickland Oil Terminals v.
Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), (b) (1988).
236. Id. § 9603(f)(1).
237. See, eg., State v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 676 (D. Idaho 1986); State v.
Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,
572 F. Supp. 802, 805-08 (S.D. Ohio 1983).




The federal statute contains no guidance for apportionment of liability
among PRPs. The statute does provide, however, for the EPA to conduct a
nonbinding preliminary allocation of responsibility. 239 For guidance, courts
have looked to the legislative history of CERCLA, specifically the Gore
Amendment. 240 Though not enacted, that amendment contains a number of
factors that courts have taken into account in allocating responsibility
among PRPs.241
Under CERCLA, joint and several liability may be avoided if it can be
demonstrated that the release or threatened release is divisible.242 Federal
case law suggests that joint and several liability also may be inappropriate if
there is another rational basis for allocating liability.243 For example, joint
and several liability may be inappropriate if each of the PRPs disposed of the
same types of waste and the relative volumes are known.244
E. Statutory Defenses
1. Overview
Though under CERCLA liability is strict, there are several affirmative
statutory defenses.24 5 To escape liability, a PRP must establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of hazardous
substances and the resulting damages were caused solely by an act of God,
an act of war, an act or omission of a third party, or any combination of
these causes.246 Of these defenses, the most viable is the third-party defense.
PRPs seeking to take advantage of this defense, however, have a difficult
burden.
2. Elements of Third-Party Defense
To take advantage of the third-party defense, a PRP must establish: (1)
the release or threat of release and resulting damages were caused solely by
the third party; (2) the third party was not (a) the PRP's employee, (b) the
PRP's agent, or (c) one whose act or omission occurred in connection with a
contractual relationship with the PRP; (3) the PRP exercised due care with
respect to the hazardous substance taking into consideration the characteris-
tics of the material, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances; and (4)
239. Id. § 9622(e)(3).
240. See Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1116 (N.D.
Ill. 1988).
241. See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (S.D. I11. 1984).
242. See United States v. Miami Drum Servs., Inc., 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1469, 1475
(S.D. Fla. 1986).
243. See United States v. Tyson, Hazardous Waste Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publication)
12,983 (E.D. Pa. 1988); O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 724-26 (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd, 883
F.2d 176 (lst Cir. 1989); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1395-96(D.N.H. 1985) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §§ 433A, 433B, 875, 881 (1976)),
modified, 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1152 (D.N.H. 1986).
244. See Ottati, 630 F. Supp. at 1396.




the PRP took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such
third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such
acts or omissions.2 47 Of these elements of proof, the most difficult have been
sole causation and the lack of a contractual relationship.
3. Contractual Relationship
The pertinent language concerning the lack of a contractual relationship is
unclear. Arguably this provision applies only if the contractual relationship
existed at the time the release occurred. Stated alternatively, the third-party
defense should not be vitiated by a contract if the act or omission causing the
release did not occur in connection with any contractual relationship.
Unfortunately from the PRP's perspective, courts have chosen not to fo-
cus on the nuances of that provision and have held PRPs liable if any con-
tractual relationship existed with the third party.2 48 As a consequence,
lessors, as owners, have been held liable for actions of their lessees, and lend-
ers, as operators, for the actions of their borrowers.249
4. Innocent-Purchaser Defense
To ameliorate the harsh effects of the contractual bar, CERCLA was
amended to add the so-called innocent-purchaser defense. SARA added to
CERCLA a new section, 101(35)(A),250 that clarified that the term contrac-
tual relationship in section 107(b)(3)25 1 includes instruments transferring ti-
tle or possession to real property,252 but added an exemption. This
exemption applies if the real property on which the facility is located was
acquired by the PRP after the disposal or placement of the hazardous sub-
stance and one of the following conditions is satisfied: (1) at the time of
acquisition, the PRP did not know and had no reason to know that any
hazardous substance was disposed of at the facility; (2) the PRP is a govern-
mental entity that involuntarily or through the exercise of eminent domain
acquired the property; or (3) the PRP acquired the facility by inheritance or
bequest.253
To avail itself of the innocent-purchaser defense, a PRP must demonstrate
that it made all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of
the property, consistent with good commercial and customary practice in an
effort to minimize liability.254 In making its determination, the court is in-
structed to consider: (1) any knowledge or experience on the part of the
PRP; (2) the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if
247. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1048 (2d Cir. 1985).
248. United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989);
see infra text accompanying notes 177-178.
249. For a discussion of lessor, lessee, and lender liability as operators, see supra text ac-
companying notes 136-144 and 199-202.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988).
251. Id. § 9601(35)(A)-(C).
252. Id.
253. Id. § 9601(35)(A).
254. Id. § 9601(35)(B).
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uncontaminated; (3) commonly known or reasonably ascertainable informa-
tion about the property; (4) the obviousness of the presence or likely pres-
ence of contamination at the property; and (5) the ability to detect such
contamination by appropriate inspection. 255
The legislative history of SARA indicates that the duty to inquire to qual-
ify as an innocent purchaser is to be judged as of the time of acquisition. 256
Purchasers are to be held to a high standard regarding inspection and must
have made a reasonable inquiry into all circumstances in light of best busi-
ness and land transfer principles.257 Those engaged in commercial transac-
tions are to be held to a higher standard than those engaged in private or
residential transactions. 258 As a consequence, prospective purchasers have a
strong incentive to make a reasonable investigation so that they may take
advantage of the section 107(b)(3) defense if subsequently they should dis-
cover that the property is contaminated.
A lessor whose lessee creates contamination by definition cannot be an
innocent purchaser because it is a current owner and, therefore, can never
take advantage of the third-party defense. 259 As a practical matter, a lend-
ing institution that forecloses and takes title to contaminated property also
will be hard-pressed to take advantage of the innocent-purchaser defense,
because of the due diligence requirement, if the contamination occurred dur-
ing the period of the loan. If, however, the contamination were pre-existing,
then the defense should be potentially available.
It is important to note that the innocent-purchaser provision and the re-
quirement of due diligence do not apply when the PRP is not in privity of
contract with the person responsible for the contamination.260 Subsequent
purchasers need show only that the release was solely caused by a third
party, that they exercised due care with respect to the materials, and that
they took precaution against foreseeable acts.26 ' In United States v. Pacific
Hide & Fur Depot, Inc.,262 however, the court suggested that any contract
involving real property triggers the innocent-purchaser requirements.263
The statute, however, indicates that the contract must be with the party
causing the contamination. 26 As noted, if an owner of property obtained
actual knowledge of the release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance at the facility when that person owned the property and subsequently
transferred ownership without disclosing that knowledge, that person is
255. Id.
256. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 186, 186-88, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3279, 3280-81.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See State v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 589 (W.D. Wash. 1988), discussed at 1988
Hazardous Waste Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publication) 12,869 (July 4, 1988).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988): "[A]n act or omission of a third party other than an
employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection
with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly with the defendant ... 
261. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
262. 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989).
263. Id. at 1346-47.
264. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988).
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treated as a PRP and the third-party defense is not available.2 65
Several courts have considered the innocent-purchaser defense. In Wick-
land Oil Terminals v. Asarco Inc.266 Wickland asserted that Asarco, from
whom it acquired property on which there was slag, was responsible for
remediation and sought summary judgment. Because Wickland knew of the
presence of the slag and failed to conduct an appropriate inquiry, the court
denied Wickland's motion and granted Asarco's counterclaim, holding
Wickland to be a PRP.267 In United States v. Serafini,268 on the other hand,
the court denied the government's motion for summary judgment, finding
that a failure to inspect in 1969 did not necessarily vitiate the innocent-pur-
chaser defense. 269
CERCLA amendments currently are pending in Congress to clarify the
requirements of appropriate inquiry under the innocent purchaser de-
fense.270 The bill would create a rebuttable presumption of all appropriate
inquiry for purposes of certain commercial transactions. The rebuttable pre-
sumption would be available if a preacquisition investigation were conducted
by an environmental professional, which included: (1) historical research of
prior ownership and uses; (2) governmental records review; and (3) an on-
site investigation. 271
Even if a purchaser were able to assert successfully the innocent-purchaser
defense under CERCLA, as a practical matter, the purchaser nonetheless
could be required to remediate on-site conditions to preclude or reduce lia-
bility to third parties with potential toxic tort claims. In Texas, for example,
the owner of property containing a nuisance becomes liable for the conse-
quences of that nuisance if the owner knows of its existence.
272
5. De Minimis Settlement
An innocent purchaser who fails to satisfy the requirements of having
made a reasonable investigation pursuant to section 107(b)(3)273 nonetheless
may obtain some relief under section 122(g)(1) 274 of CERCLA. This section
authorizes the EPA to enter into a de minimis settlement with an innocent
purchaser if the purchaser did not conduct or permit the generation, trans-
portation, storage, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous substance at the
facility and did not contribute to the release or threat of release of a hazard-
ous substance through any act or omission, unless the purchaser had actual
or constructive knowledge that the property was used for the generation,
265. Id § 9601(35)(C).
266. No. C-83-5906-SC (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 1988), reprinted in Hazardous Waste Litig.
Rep. (Andrews Publication) 12,533 (1988).
267. Id. at 12,536.
268. 711 F. Supp. 197 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
269. Id. at 197-98; see also United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp.
1341, 1341 (D. Idaho 1989).
270. H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. 3317 (1989).
271. See id
272. 54 TEx. JUR. 3D Nuisances § 24 (1987).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988).
274. Id. § 9622(g)(1).
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transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance.275 Thus, an innocent purchaser who failed to make a reasonable in-
quiry may cut its losses through a de minimis settlement.
On August 18, 1989, the EPA published its guidance for de minimis set-
tlements for landowners. 27 6 That guidance suggests that the EPA will con-
duct a case-by-case review of items such as the condition of the property at
the time of purchase, representations made at the time of sale regarding
prior uses of the property, the purchase price, fair market value of compara-
ble property, and information regarding any specialized knowledge on the
part of the purchaser that may be relevant.277 Using this guidance, the EPA
is unlikely to release a PRP completely from liability because of the inno-
cent-purchaser defense. Based upon the strength of a PRP's defense, the
EPA may instead allow the PRP to enter a de minimis settlement. In a de
minimis settlement, the settling PRP pays a proportionately higher amount
of the estimated cleanup costs in settlement of the EPA claims against the
PRP to avoid protracted and expensive litigation and its uncertain results.
The policy statement focuses on the state of knowledge of the purchaser at
the time of acquisition and appears to mistakenly apply the test for establish-
ing an innocent-purchaser defense, that is, not whether the defendant had
actual or constructive knowledge, as provided for de minimis settlement
under the statute, but rather whether the landowner conducted all appropri-
ate inquiry. If the all appropriate inquiry test were satisfied, the landowner
should incur no liability, not de minimis liability. The EPA also mistakenly
asserts that this test must be satisfied if the contamination were caused by
someone not in the chain of title, such as a midnight dumper. In that case,
the contractual relationship that otherwise would vitiate the third-party de-
fenses would be absent. Thus, the landowner would not need to demonstrate
that it was an innocent purchaser, but instead; only that the contamination
was solely caused by a third party.
In the same statement, the EPA announced a policy for settling with pro-
spective purchasers if the purchasers participate in a cleanup. Recently, the
agency entered into such a settlement. 278 In exchange for limited response
actions, the EPA covenanted not to sue the prospective purchaser and
others.
F Real Property Transactions and CERCLA
Typically, litigation involving real property transactions is brought by a
purchaser who discovers the existence of on-site contamination. The cause
of action may be based on the contract, tortious theories such as fraud or
negligent misrepresentation, or state deceptive trade practices statutes. Fre-
quently causes of action relating to the contract are coupled with private
275. Id.
276. 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235 (1989).
277. Id
278. See Contaminated Property Sales-First EPA Covenant Not to Sue Purchaser, 4 INSIDE
EPA's SUPERFUND REP., Sept. 13, 1989, at 3.
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CERCLA claims.279 As the developing case law clearly suggests, an under-
standing of the interrelationship between CERCLA and contractual claims
is important to those negotiating real estate transactions. Pertinent issues
discussed below include: the applicability of caveat emptor; the effect of var-
ious contractual provisions including releases, "as is" clauses, indemnifica-
tion provisions, and representations; and sellers' use of CERCLA.
1. Caveat Emptor
In a number of cases involving CERCLA claims, the seller has interposed
a defense of caveat emptor or buyer beware. The seller's assertion is that the
rule, in effect, releases the seller from CERCLA liability to the buyer, be-
cause the buyer had responsibility for determining if any defects existed.
The developing case law appears to be moving in the direction of considering
caveat emptor in equitably allocating costs, but generally not as a bar to a
CERCLA action.280
In Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules, Inc. 21 a property owner brought
suit claiming negligence, private nuisance, and public nuisance against the
seller and its predecessor-in-interest because of contamination of ground-
water during that company's operation of an on-site chemical plant. The
court rejected a private-nuisance theory because private-nuisance law applies
to conflicts between neighboring, contemporaneous land uses, rather than
successive landowners. 28 2 The court also rejected a public-nuisance claim,
finding a lack of standing.28 3 Applying the rule of caveat emptor, the court
next rejected the plaintiff's request for indemnification. 284 The court ex-
plained it was not stating the general proposition that a party that contami-
nates land, or its successor, can escape liability by selling the property, but
only that the purchaser had no cause of action.2 5 The court suggested that
causes of action might lie with neighboring landowners and the public. 28 6
In contrast, in Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.287 the
court ruled the doctrine of caveat emptor unavailable as a defense in actions
under CERCLA, even though the purchaser's predecessor had inspected the
property and knew of the possibility that environmental cleanup costs might
be incurred in the future. 288 The court held that factors pertinent to the
doctrine of caveat emptor could only be considered in mitigating the amount
279. See supra note 98.
280. See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 980 (1985); PVO Int'l, Inc. v. Drew Chem. Corp., Hazardous Waste Litig. Rep. (An-
drews Publication) 13,136 (D.N.J. 1988).
281. 762 F.2d at 303.
282. Id. at 315-16.
283. Id. Similarly, in Amland Properties Corp. v. ALCOA, 711 F. Supp. 784 (D.N.J.
1989), the court rejected claims by a subsequent property owner against a prior owner based
on private and public nuisance, finding those claims inapplicable. Id. at 807-09.
284. 762 F.2d at 316-19.
285. Id. at 318.
286. Id.
287. 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 837 (1989).
288. Id. at 89-90.
19901
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
due.289 In PVO International, Inc. v. Drew Chemical Corp.,290 PVO, the
present owner of a site, brought suit against Drew, the former owner and
operator, and argued in its motion for summary judgment that even if liable
as a PRP, PVO should be entitled to 100 percent recovery against Drew,
who caused the contamination. The court denied the motion referencing,
among other things, the increase in property value that would be attributable
to removal of hazardous waste-a pertinent equitable consideration in the
allocation of costs. 2 9 ' In Sunnen Products Co. v. Chemtech Industries,
Inc. 292 the court rejected the seller's defense of caveat emptor and held the
seller strictly liable to the buyer for its cleanup costs. 293
2. Releases
Parties to a contract can allocate or transfer CERCLA liabilities between
themselves. The intent to allocate liabilities, however, must be clear. In
Mardan Corp. v. C. G. C. Music Ltd.294 the purchaser of a manufacturing fa-
cility and related property brought an action against a seller seeking recov-
ery for costs incurred in cleaning up a waste disposal site. The court
construed provisions of the contract between the parties and concluded that
the release barred the buyer's private right of action under CERCLA, de-
spite the asserted mutual mistake of fact concerning the necessity for
cleanup.295
In Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc. 296 the purchaser of a chemical
plant sued the seller, seeking contribution under CERCLA or indemnity
under the contract. The court noted that the parties could, between them-
selves, allocate or transfer CERCLA liability, but, unlike the parties in
Mardan, they did not.297 The court explained that to preclude recovery of
response costs, an express provision in the contract must allocate these risks
to one party.298 Citing FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co. ,299 the court said
the release need not specifically reference CERCLA as long as it is worded
sufficiently broadly to encompass CERCLA claims. 30° The Southland court
also noted that equitable factors affect apportionment, not the issue of
liability.30'
3. "As Is" Clauses
A number of cases involve contracts containing "as is" clauses. In Inter-
289. Id. at 90.
290. Hazardous Waste Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publication) 13,136 (D.N.J. 1988).
291. Id. at 13,140.
292. 658 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
293. Id. at 278.
294. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
295. Id. at 1461-63.
296. 696 F. Supp. 994 (D.N.J. 1988).
297. Id. at 1000.
298. Id. at 1002.
299. 668 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (D. Minn. 1987).
300. 696 F. Supp. at 1002.
301. Id. at 1003.
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national Clinical Laboratories, Inc. v. Stevens3 0 2 the court held that although
"as is" clauses might defeat claims based on breach of warranty, "as is"
clauses do not affect CERCLA claims.3 03 The court further found that the
failure to inspect the property prior to the sale did not defeat CERCLA
claims. 3°4 The court distinguished Mardan,305 noting that in that case the&$as is" clause also was not held to be a bar to a CERCLA action, and that
the release, not the disclaimer, barred the CERCLA claim. 30 6 The Stevens
court conceded that the steps taken or not taken by the buyer to protect
itself likely would be relevant in apportioning liability for costs.307 The
Southland 308 case also involved an "as is" clause, which that court found
precluded a breach of warranty claim, but did not bar the CERCLA
claim.309
4. Indemnification
The Southland court also considered an indemnification provision. In
granting Southland's motion for reconsideration, the court- held that the in-
demnification provision in the contract was effective and provided a viable,
alternative basis for recovery.310 The court held that the provision did not
limit recovery to situations involving formal lawsuits.311 The court con-
trasted that provision to the provision in issue in Jones v. Sun Carriers
Inc.,312 in which a formal demand was a prerequisite to recovery under an
indemnification provision. In Channel Master Satellite Systems, Inc. v. JFD
Electronics Corp.,313 also involving CERCLA cleanup claims, the contract
contained an indemnification running from the buyer to the seller, but it
related only to violations of law, meaning violations of state or local law.
Because the cleanup under CERCLA was voluntary and involved no viola-
tion and because CERCLA is a federal law, the court held the indemnifica-
tion provision inapplicable.314
5. Seller's Reliance on CERCLA
Most cases relying on CERCLA involve disgruntled purchasers. In some
instances, however, sellers have sought to take advantage of CERCLA. In
Garb-Ko, Inc. v. Lansing-Lewis Services, Inc. 31 5 the seller sought to rescind a
contract for the sale of land based on a defect in the property discovered
302. 710 F. Supp. 466 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
303. Id. at 470.
304. Id.
305. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
306. 710 F. Supp. at 470.
307. Id. at 471.
308. 696 F. Supp. 994 (D.N.J. 1988).
309. Id. at 1001.
310. Id. at 1003-04.
311. Id. at 1000.
312. 856 F.2d 1091, 1093 (8th Cir. 1988).
313. 702 F. Supp. 1229, 1230-32 (E.D.N.C. 1988).
314. Id. at 1232.
315. 167 Mich. App. 779, 423 N.W.2d 355 (1988).
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after the parties entered into the sales agreement. At the time they executed
the agreement, neither party was aware that underground gasoline storage
tanks were leaking. The stated concern of the seller was its continuing obli-
gations and responsibilities for the environmental contamination over which
it no longer would have control. The court upheld rescission of the contract,
reasoning that the seller needed to have control and use of the property to
contain further cleanup costs and third-party claims. 3 16
In Greer Properties, Inc. v. LaSalle National Bank,3 17 a contract provided
the seller with an out if the cost of cleanup rendered the sale economically
impractical, based on its best business judgment. The seller used this clause
to terminate the contract, but then subsequently entered into a more profita-
ble contract with another purchaser. The court reversed a summary judg-
ment in favor of the seller and determined that a fact issue existed. 3 18
6. Representations
In Nunn v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. 3 19 the former owners of a
corporation operating an industrial waste disposal facility brought suit
against the buyers of the corporation for breach of their contractual duty to
pay for the corporation's stock. The buyer counterclaimed for, among other
things, breach of warranty. The court held that the seller's warranty that
the facility complied with all laws was breached when leakage in violation of
state law was discovered. 320 The court awarded the cost of remediation, but
noted that the CERCLA claims had not been fully developed.32 1
If the leakage in Nunn were not a violation of state law, however, a war-
ranty and representation of compliance with environmental laws would not
support recovery by the purchaser because no violation would have oc-
curred. The existence of liability under CERCLA or section 7003(a) of
RCRA is not based on any violation, but rather on the presence of, or an
involvement with, hazardous substances or solid waste.322
V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN EVALUATING AND
STRUCTURING A DEAL
As this Article makes clear, any contract involving commercial real estate
should address environmental concerns. Knowledgeable parties have a vari-
ety of options for handling the risks and uncertainties associated with on-site
contamination and other environmental concerns and for enabling them to
proceed with their transaction. Some of these approaches for addressing en-
vironmental concerns are suggested below.
316. Id. at 357-58.
317. 689 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. I11. 1988), rev'd, 874 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1989).
318. 874 F.2d at 461.
319. 856 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1988).
320. Id. at 1470.
321. Id. at 1470-71.
322. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D) (1988).
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A. Structure of the Deal
1. Business Form of Purchaser
Because the costs associated with on-site contamination may far exceed
the value of the property and because liability may attach solely by virtue of
ownership, a prospective purchaser of property with potential environmental
concerns should consider structuring the transaction to limit liability to the
value of the investment by creating a corporation or limited partnership.
The liability of a corporation, a general partner, and an individual under
Superfund statutes is unlimited. 323
2. Assets or Stock
In an acquisition of assets that includes real estate, the concerns of the
purchaser relate to the on-site presence of contamination and to existing vio-
lations that may continue after the deal is closed. The condition of adjacent
property also may be of concern. For example, if on-site contamination ex-
ists on adjacent property, the purchaser may not be able to develop the ac-
quired property until the contamination has been addressed. If the adjacent
property owner is insolvent, the cleanup costs may fall upon the purchaser,
although recovery against the Superfund is possible.324 In an assets acquisi-
tion, the possibility of de facto merger or some other form of successor liabil-
ity also should be considered. The concerns of the seller generally relate to
the possibility of being held jointly and severally responsible for new or exac-
erbated conditions created by the purchaser. 325
In a stock acquisition or merger, the concerns of the purchaser include, in
addition to those associated with an assets acquisition, potential liabilities
relating to off-site disposal and prior violations. Because the purchaser in a
merger steps into the shoes of the seller, the purchaser may be responsible
for the actions of its predecessor. 326 The shareholder, officer, or employee,
however, should not be liable for the preacquisition actions of the predeces-
sor company: potential liability as an operator should be prospective only,
though liability may be joint and several. 327 The concerns of the seller relate
to the possibility of being held jointly and severally responsible as an opera-
tor for new or exacerbating conditions created by the purchaser, based on
the prior involvement of the seller in the management of the site.328
323. Id. Compare id. with 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1988).
324. See text accompanying notes 219-238.
325. These concerns were the basis for the action by the seller in Garb-Ko, Inc. v. Lansing-
Lewis Servs., Inc., 167 Mich. App. 779, 423 N.W.2d 355, 355 (1988) to rescind its contract of
sale.
326. 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1630 (1940). A number of cases, however, suggest that the
corporate veil will not be pierced absent a showing of corporate control at the time of occur-
rence of the activity giving rise to liability. See, e.g., Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc., 453 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1972).
327. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co.(NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp.
823, 847 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (vice president and major stockholder held jointly and severally
liable), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 848 (1987).
328. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (1988).
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3. Properties with Existing Problems
For the seller, the retention of problem property insures adequate control
and the ability to remediate. A sale of the problem property creates the
potential for joint and several liability with the purchaser. 329 For the pur-
chaser, the retention of the problem property by the seller avoids associated
liabilities unless the acquisition is of stock or by a merger and the acquired
company is liable for that property even though it no longer owns the prop-
erty. From the purchaser's perspective, even if the problem property is
carved out, contamination on the retained property might affect the value
and use of the property that is acquired. Consequently, in addition to carv-
ing out the property, it may be worthwhile for the purchaser to insist on
provisions addressing the potential for the retained property to contaminate
the newly acquired property, for instance, an indemnification.
Another option for both parties is a lease purchase. From the purchaser's
perspective, it allows time to evaluate the property prior to assuming owner-
ship and associated liabilities. In addition, it allows access to property for
other uses that may not create liability. From the perspective of the owner
as a potential lessor, a key concern is possible liability resulting from on-site
conditions created by the lessee.330 The lease likely would vitiate any third-
party defense. On the other hand, the lease purchase option may enable a
deal to go forward that otherwise might be stalled until complete resolution
of the environmental problem could be completed. As noted, the law is un-
settled as to whether a lessee, not an operator or a sublessor, can be an owner
under section 107.331 Another more conservative approach is simply to ac-
quire an option, with a right to inspect or test.
4. Involvement of Lender in the Affairs of the Borrower
For the lender, substantial involvement in the affairs of the borrower may
create liability for on-site and off-site conditions, as well as for violations of
environmental statutes, as an operator.332 At the same time, however, the
lender does want assurance that the value of the collateral will not be ad-
versely affected. Additionally, if the lender were to foreclose and acquire the
property, the lender would have responsibility as a current owner for any on-
site conditions. 333 In drafting the loan document, therefore, the lender needs
to walk a fine line between adequate protection and undue involvement.
329. Id.
330. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985) (owner responsi-
ble for unauthorized tenants); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1563
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (owner and tenant jointly and severally liable); United States v. Argent, 21
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354, 1355 (D.N.M. 1984) (owner responsible regardless of connection
to tenant's business).
331. Id.
332. See supra notes 192-198 and accompanying text.
333. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
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5. Involvement of Acquiring Shareholders in the Management of an
Acquired Company
In general, the company, but not the acquiring shareholder, continues to
be liable for preacquisition conditions and violations.334 On the other hand,
the acquiring shareholder, if actively involved in the management or, possi-
bly, if possessing the potential to control the acquired company, may acquire
on-going liability for actions of the company after the acquisition. 335 Pre-
sumably, however, the acquiring shareholder would not acquire liability for
pre-existing conditions or actions.
B. Pertinent Provisions
1. Representations and Warranties
A number of representations and warranties are useful in addressing envi-
ronmental concerns. Any exceptions to a representation or warranty should
be included in schedules. These scheduled items may indicate areas on
which the environmental audit should focus. In each case, the seller or bor-
rower likely will attempt to limit the representation and warranty by adding
the qualifier: "to the best of [seller's or borrower's] knowledge" or by requir-
ing that the matter referred to result in a "material adverse effect." From
the perspective of either the purchaser or the lender, of course, a representa-
tion or warranty without such limitations is preferable. The seller also may
attempt to add a disclaimer of warranty that real property is being sold "as
is."'336 Any representation and warranty should be supported by a corre-
sponding provision for indemnification. The value of that indemnification,
of course, depends on the solvency of the seller. The representation and
warranty should survive closing.
a. Disposal On-Site.
From the purchaser's perspective, it is important to receive representa-
tions and warranties that there has been no on-site disposal of hazardous
substances as defined in CERCLA,337 of petroleum, because petroleum is
not a hazardous substance under CERCLA, or of other pollutants. The
problem with this representation is that leakage of oil from automobiles liter-
ally would fall within the scope of the representation. A qualification could
be added that the representation extends only to those substances the pres-
ence of which poses a threat to human health or welfare or the environment.
Also useful would be representations concerning the absence of storage
tanks, both above ground and, especially, below ground, because contamina-
tion often is associated with tanks, as well as representations concerning spe-
334. See supra notes 110-112.
335. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co.(NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part and remanded, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987).
336. See supra text accompanying notes 303-309.
337. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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cific materials like asbestos and PCBs. These representations and warranties
should be coupled with the right to perform or have performed an environ-
mental audit.
A representation and warranty concerning on-site contaminants also is
useful for a prospective lender. On-site contamination adversely affects the
value of the collateral and makes foreclosure undesirable. Such a representa-
tion and warranty also might provide some protection to appraisers, brokers,
and counsel.
b. Disposal Off-Site.
If the potential exists for acquiring the liabilities of the seller, the pur-
chaser should obtain a representation concerning off-site disposal. As noted,
generators of hazardous substances who have disposed of their wastes off-site
have liability under CERCLA if the site itself poses a threat to human health
through the environment. 338
c. Environmental Compliance.
From the perspective of both the purchaser and the lender, a representa-
tion and warranty that a facility complies with environmental laws is useful.
It is important to note, however, that liability under Superfund arises in-
dependent of any violation. 339 As a consequence, a representation and war-
ranty of compliance with environmental laws will not be breached by the
presence of on-site contamination triggering CERCLA liabilities.
In general, a representation and warranty concerning compliance will be
more useful for ongoing operations, which must comply with environmental
regulations, than for the purchase of undeveloped land. Many states, how-
ever, do proscribe leaks.34° In some states, a failure to record notice of ex-
isting contamination in the county real property records also may be a
violation.341 Such a failure also may be a violation of the notification re-
quirements under state or federal law depending on when the contamination
occurred.342
d. Existing or Threatened Judicial Administrative Litigation.
From the perspective of the purchaser and the lender, it would be useful
to have a representation and warranty stating that there is no existing or
threatened judicial or administrative litigation. The representation might go
further and assert that the seller or borrower is aware of no facts that would
give rise to litigation.
338. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988).
339. Id. § 9607.
340. Nunn v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 856 F.2d 1464, 1468 (10th Cir. 1988).
341. The Texas Water Commission has asserted that there is an ongoing obligation to deed
record contamination resulting not only from intentional disposal, but from spills as well, even
though that occurred prior to the effective date of that provision.
342. 33 U.S.C. § 132(b)(5) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (1988); New Jersey Hazardous Sub-
stance Discharge Reports and Notices Rule, N.J.A.C. 7:1-7.1 (West Supp. 1988).
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a Existence of Laws or Regulations Adversely Affecting Use of Property
or Transactions; Fitness for Intended Purpose; and Necessity
of Government Consent to Transfer Property.
Because a seller or borrower may have peculiar information not readily
available, a purchaser or lender should obtain a representation and warranty
concerning the existence of laws with potential adverse effects, the fitness of
property for a particular purpose, and the necessity for governmental con-
sents to transfer property. In New Jersey, for example, the Environmental
Cleanup and Responsibility Act, or ECRA,3 43 may significantly affect a pro-
posed transaction. As a practical matter, however, the purchaser or lender




Provision for the performance of an environmental audit should be con-
sidered in all contracts concerning commercial property. Through such an
audit the seller or lender can determine if significant problems exist that
would affect the real property value. The innocent-purchaser provisions of
CERCLA virtually require that an audit be performed to demonstrate due
diligence.3 " For appraisers, brokers, and counsel, an environmental audit
helps minimize exposure to liability for breach of a duty either to discover or
to disclose an unknown or concealed problem. From the perspective of both
a seller, on the one hand, and a lessor and lessee, on the other, an audit also
is beneficial: for sellers, to prevent subsequent claims asserting pre-existing
contamination or to address problems of which the seller may be unaware;
for lessors and lessees, to establish a baseline to preclude later arguments by
the other party that it caused or contributed to on-site contamination.
For lenders and lessors, the opportunity to conduct periodic environmen-
tal audits is important: for a lessor, to insure that on-site problems are not
being created; for a lender, to insure that the value of its collateral is not
being impaired and also, as protection, prior to foreclosure.
It is important that the contract also contain provisions for responding to
the results of the audit. The ability to perform an audit is of little value if the
contract has no provisions that enable the parties to take advantage of the
results of that investigation. For example, both parties to a sale may use the
results to quantify liabilities, to adjust the purchase price, or to create an
escrow.
b. Authorization to Review Government Files.
Although government files generally are available under various state
343. See supra note 35.




open records acts and the federal Freedom of Information Act,3 45 it often is
helpful to have express authorization from a company to review files relating
to the company. As a consequence, provisions should be included in the
contract to authorize the review of those documents. This type of provision
is especially useful for ongoing businesses that routinely are regulated by
environmental agencies.
c. Provision of Corporate Documents and Access to Files.
Obviously, an adequate investigation requires access to pertinent corpo-
rate documents. Confidentiality, however, may pose some concerns for the
seller. This concern may be addressed by a confidentiality agreement. Files
may be found not only at corporate headquarters, but at individual facilities
as well. Both locations should be investigated.
d. Cooperation in Investigation, Ongoing Cooperation with
Environmental Agencies, and Post-deal Access to the Site.
This type of provision is useful in assuring that necessary work can be
done, from the perspective of both the purchaser and the seller. If an ongo-
ing problem is discovered, the seller, who may have responsibility, may need
access to the site to do necessary work. The purchaser also may find it use-
ful to be able to refer to information and resources of the seller in discussions
with environmental agencies.
e. Remediation of Existing Problems.
Provisions should be included in the contract concerning problems that
are uncovered by the environmental audit or that otherwise are known. A
determination should be made as to how these problems will be addressed.
Included within that provision should be consideration of who will do the
work and how the parties will determine that the work has been accom-
plished. A key issue in these types of situations is: how clean is clean? Re-
course to state environmental agencies sometimes is a useful method for
addressing this issue. Another option is to have independent consultants for
both parties to the transaction, with recourse to a third consultant selected
by the other two in case of a conflict.
An advantage to a purchaser who performs the work and is reimbursed by
the seller is some additional degree of certainty that the job is being done
correctly. On the other hand, the remediation itself could give rise to liabil-
ity. The site to which the contaminated materials are taken could become a
problem, or adjacent landowners or residents might assert damage to health
or property as a result of the cleanup. For that reason, the purchaser may
prefer the seller to have responsibility for remediation and that remediation
occur prior to closing.
345. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
[Vol. 43
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
f Transfer of Permits.
If existing permits need to be transferred, it is important that the parties
cooperate in the transfer. Timing may pose another issue. Because the
transfer of permits typically cannot be effected at the time of closing of the
transaction, either the seller or the buyer may well incur liabilities associated
with an untransferred permit. The parties should address this concern.
g. Covenant Not to Handle On-Site Hazardous Substances and to Allow
On-Site Inspection to Verify.
From the perspective of the lender or lessor, it is important that the cove-
nant contain a provision to prevent the borrower or lessee from handling
hazardous substances or other pollutants of concern on-site, unless the activ-
ity is a necessary part of the business. In that case, other provisions should
be included. Such a provision, for example, might impose restrictions on the
presence and use of chemicals on-site. To provide teeth to that covenant, the
lessor should insert a provision allowing on-site inspections to verify.
3. Releases
From the perspective of the seller, if part of the consideration for the deal
is that monies will be expended to clean up the site, then it would be useful
to have a release and possibly an indemnification, to be in place after cleanup
has been effected. The release, if it is to cover CERCLA liabilities, should
expressly reference them. The release would protect against litigation by the
purchaser; the indemnification would provide reimbursement for litigation
by third parties.
4. Indemnification
With regard to each of the representations and warranties, the purchaser
or lessor should insert a provision providing for indemnification. The in-
demnification provision should indicate the period for which it is in effect
and the trigger for the applicability of that provision. If the party providing
the indemnification is not financially sound and, possibly regardless, consid-
eration should be given to establishing an escrow or requiring environmental
impairment liability insurance, if available.
5. Escrow
To the extent environmental liabilities are unknown, the use of an escrow
is a useful method for assuring that funds will be available, particularly if the
seller may not have the financial wherewithal, to cover the costs. The es-
crow also is useful for known, but unquantified liabilities. The escrow agree-
ment should explicitly state what kinds of expenses are covered and what
triggers the ability to draw on the fund, for example, the discovery of a prob-
lem or the assertion of a claim.
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6 Allocation of Liabilities
In particular where ongoing businesses are involved, but in other situa-
tions as well, it is useful to provide for an allocation of liabilities. Often these
liabilities are divided, with the seller having responsibility for conditions ex-
isting prior to closing and the purchaser having responsibility for conditions
arising after closing. A key issue relates to the placement of the burden of
proof should a problem arise. The placement of the burden may determine
who ends up responsible. In addition, a seller may want to have a cut-off
period so that if no liabilities are discovered within a certain time period,
then regardless of the factual situation giving rise to those liabilities, the pur-
chaser is liable if the time period has expired. Among the costs to be consid-
ered in allocating liabilities are costs of environmental compliance, remedial
costs, and toxic tort liability.
Z Insurance
Much litigation has concerned the ability of an insured to recover on a
comprehensive general liability policy that contains a pollution exclusion. In
many instances, such recovery has been allowed, though case law is di-
vided.346 Consequently, the existence of an insurance policy may be a valua-
ble asset if contamination is later discovered, provided the policy is an
occurrence policy rather than a claims-made policy. The parties should in-
clude a provision to determine who is entitled to recover under a policy.
Additionally, environmental impairment liability policies may be available
to protect against liability for off-site contamination. If available, these poli-
cies can be useful to quantify unknown liabilities.
. Counsel's Opinions
From the perspective of the lender, the lessor, and the purchaser, it may
be useful to have counsel for the other party opine that pertinent require-
ments have been satisfied. This opinion generally may track the representa-
tions and warranties made by counsel's client and should provide some
additional degree of comfort.
9. No Assignment Without Consent
To insure that a carefully worded contract is not rendered ineffectual, the
contract should prohibit the borrower or lessee from transferring or subleas-
ing the property to another without approval by the lender or owner. Liabil-
ities may be based on on-site conditions, regardless of who creates them.347
10. Alternative Dispute Resolution
The parties to a real estate transaction should consider the inclusion of a
provision dealing with alternative dispute resolution. Environmental issues
346. Compare Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986) with
Port of Portland v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 549 F. Supp. 233 (D. Or. 1982).
347. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988).
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are highly complex and expensive to resolve through litigation. Mediation
and binding arbitration are two less expensive alternatives.
VI. CONCLUSION
Environmental laws are complex, far-reaching, and of potentially tremen-
dous significance in transactions involving real estate. To address the con-
cerns associated with this complex body of law, real estate professionals
should be familiar with the ways in which various environmental laws can
affect both real estate and the parties to a real estate transaction. Provisions
should be included in any commercial real estate transaction to identify per-
tinent environmental liabilities and restrictions on land use and to address
those concerns in the structuring of the transaction and in the preparation of
transaction documents. The risks, though significant, generally can be
addressed.

